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DETERMINANTS OF OPTION SPREADS IN A MULTIPLE LISTING ENVIRONMENT
Rebecca Abraham , Nova So uth eas tem U ni versit y
Charl es Harrington , Nova South eastem Univ ersity
This study empirically determined the predictors of bid-ask spreads of equity options within the context of
the current multiple-listed options market. Price emerged as the most powerful predictor followed by
multiple listing. Price and volatility increased spreads, while multiple listing and volume reduced them.
Multiple listing was more powetful than volume in explaining !>preads. This study establishes that spread
reductions prevail several years after initial multiple listing and supports the importance of competition
over economies of scale in explaining spreads.
INTRODUCTION

For th e past fo ur years, the exc hanges have plun ged
into campa ign s des igned to attract other exchan ges to
purchas ing opti o ns that had hi therto been s ingly li sted so
that at prese nt, full y 85 % of put and ca ll options traded
o n the American Stoc k Exc hange are multiple li sted.
Durin g th e options ca mpai g n of 1999 a lone, li stings on a
s ingle exchange declined in vo lu me fro m 61 % during
the pre -o pti o ns ca .. Ipai gn pha se to 24% at the c lose of
the ca mpa ign . We may as ume that the c urrent options
market is a matu re marke t fro m a multipl e li sting
perspecti ve.
Other de ten11in a nts of opt io n spreads derived fro m
th e literature (sec Co ug heno ur & Shastri , 1999 , for a
rcvicvv) in c lude pri ce, vo lume of tTadin g, and the
vo lat il ity of o pti o n pri ces. T radi ti ona l mode ls of spreads
( Ben ston & Hage rman, 197-+: oughenour & S hastri ,
1999. George, Ka ul , & Tim a lendran. 199 1; Hu ang &
Sto ll , 1997) ha ve incorpo ra ted th ese predictors. T he few
e mpiri cal studies of mu ltipl e li stin g e ffects on sprea d
we re performed in th e immed iate a ftermath of a
pa rti c ular o ptions campa ign in the 1980s a nd late 1990s
befo re the majori ty of o pti o ns beca me multip le li sted
and ·were the re fore, confin ed to s ma ll samp le s izes of
abo ut 70-2 80 option s (Dan is, 2003; De Fontnouve ll e,
2003; Ma yhew, 2002
;
Nea l, 1987 ). Consequentl y, there
is a need fo r a la rge-sca le a sessment of sprea ds that
in c ludes bo th th e traditiona l pri c in g varia bl es and
multiple li s ting. It is thi s obj ecti ve to w hich thi s study is
direc ted .

Si nce their inception in 1975, trading in equ ity
o ption s was first confi ned to th e C hi cago Board Options
Exchan ge (CBOE) and the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) then spread to the Pac ifi c Stock Exc hange
(PCX) , the Philadelph ia Stock Exc hange (PHLX) , the
Boston Stoc
k Exc hange (BOX) , and most recentl y, the
Internationa l Securities Excha nge ( ISE). The bid-ask
spread is c harged by m arke t maker on the excha nges to
traders as a transactions fee. It is the profit to the market
maker whose purcha se qu ote for options is the bid pri ce
and the sa le quote to broke r-d ea lers is the ask pri ce.
Demetz's (1968) semin al work id e ntifi es th e bid-a sk
spread as "the ma rkup that is pai d for pred ictable
immediacy of exc han ge In organ ized mar kets"
(Demsetz, 1968: 35 -36). Th e ma rke t maker is bei ng
co mpen sa ted for the func tion of making op ti o ns
ava i !ab le to c ustomers ~md the bid-as k spread is the
premium paid to marke t makers for supp ly in g opt ion s.
T rad itiona ll y, th e bu lks of equ ity option s ha ve been
b·aded on a s ingle exchange or are s in g le- li sted o pti on s.
This provided exclu s ive and po te ntially exorbita nt
franc hi se fees to the exc hanges as the bid-a sk spreads
c harged on th e optio ns co uld be set independentl y by a
sing le exchange wi th no competiti ve pressures forc ing
prices downwa rd (a s no other exc hange could list th e
sa me op ti on). ln a n a tt emp t to impro ve the qua li ty of
service a nd decrease spreads, the U. S . Sec uriti es and
Exc hange Co mmi ss ion
(SEC) adop ted Rul e 19c-5 in 1980 whi c h manda ted
mult ip le listing. Th e exc hanges vigo ro usly res isted
m ultipl e listin g for a decade . T he ir reca lc itrance end ed
with the J ustice D epartme nt t~ l in g s uit again st the
Ame ri can Stoc k Exc ha nge in 2000, th e sett leme nt of the
suit be in g cont inge nt upon the exc hanges Jccep ting a
consent decree to re fon11 the ma rke t w ith a view towa rd s
increasin g competit io n.

Published by FHSU Scholars Repository, 2006

Predicto rs of O ption
eadsSpr
As stated, the bid -a s k sprea d may be likened to a
tran sJc
onsti fee.
Acc o rdi ng ly, the hi g her the pri ce of a
good, the hi g he r w ill be th e fee (Nea l, 1987). Dani s
(200 3 ) used the exa mpl e o f a co mmi ss ion to be paid to
the deale r se llin g a $ -10,000 Lex us being substanti a ll y
highe r than th Jt paid to a dea ler o f· a£1, 000 car. Khowy
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et al. (2002) argued that the options price is a n
investment in options inventories that provides liquidi ty
in the market. As prices ri se, there is greater in vestment
in options inventori es, and in tum, hi gher bid-a sk
spreads. They tested the di ffe re nti al effects of price,
number of daily transactions, and the in- or out-of-themoney status of the option for options li sted on both the
U.S. and Montreal exc hanges. Price wa s fo und to be the
most powerful predi ctor of bid-ask spread s accounting
for 31 .6% of the variation in spreads.
Bid-ask spreads are reduced w ith rising volumes . A s
orders for the purchase or sa le of o ptions arrive through
broker-dealers, the market make r uses the inventory of
options availabl e to provide options . T he market ma ker
is being compensated for the function of maki ng option s
available to customers and the bid-a sk spread is the
premium paid to market makers for suppl yin g option s .
With options being made avai lable for sa le on multiple
exchanges, volumes rise . Ri sin g vo lumes mean that
more orders are an·i ving to be executed by the marke t
maker, so that the ma rket maker need not be
compensated hi ghl y for makin g option s avai lable for
sa le. In other words, bid-ask spread s decrease with risin g
volumes (Dani s, 2003).
Volatility is the ri sk to the market maker of holding
options on a parti c ular stock. The hi gher the risk, the
greater the retum the market maker wi ll de mand for
holding the option. As the retum to the marke t maker is
the bid-ask spread , a rise in risk will lead to the de mand
for hi gher bid-ask spreads (Dani s, 2003) . The dea ler is
forced off the effic ie nt fro nti er and hi s initial
indi ffe rence curv e consisti ng of optima l portfo li o
combinations of the ri sk-free asset and ri sky assets by
investors with their own stock and option prefere nces.
C ustomers have to pay the dealer an additiona l
amount to keep him satisfied at the new in vestme nt le ve l
with its hi gher leve l of risk T hat additiona l amount is a
hi ghe r bid-ask spread so that in creas ing vo latility is
associated
with
hi gher
spread s
(Stol l,
19 78).
Emp iri call y, tests of the impact of vo lati li ty on bid-ask
spreads have shown weak res ults w ith vo latility bein g
either in sign ifi cant in exp la inin g spread s (De
Fontnouvelle et al. , 2004; Khoury et a l. , 2002) or w ith
inconsistent signs (Dani s, 2003 , N ea l, 19 87) . Pe rhap
s, as
Nea l conj ectured , there is bia s in the me thod o f
determinin g volatility, i. e. , as the sta ndard deviatio n o f
transaction s prices . T he bid-a s k spread will cau se th e
seq uence of tran sactions to flu ctuate abo ut the true pri ce.
so that spreads and volatility wi ll have pos iti ve
con·elations rega rdl ess of security ri sk, or spread s wi ll be
overstated.

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss1/4

Intuiti ve ly, as the spread is compensa ti on to th e
market make r fo r pro viding an in ventory o f o ption s, th e
presence of ma rke t make r offerin g identi ca l products o n
other exc han ges should ca use a ll market make rs to
reduce tran sac tion fees (spreads) to re ma in competiti ve
in attracting custome rs. The fear o f fragmenta tion or loss
of orde r flow to ri val exc hanges is suffi c ient incentive to
kee p sprea ds at lowe r co mpetiti ve pri ces (Co ugheno ur &
Shastri , 199 9) . E mpiri ca l support for thi s thes is is
provided by severa l o bse rvation s o f the fo rmation of
competiti ve equilibri a either thro ugh s imul atio ns or o n
the tradin g floor. Bloo mfi eld and O ' Hara ( 199 8)
demon strated that spread dec lined fa r more rapid ly in
three-dea le r marke ts than two or s in gle dea ler marke ts
primaril y du e to th e fact th at the co mpe titi ve effect of
the addition of a third deal er in a two -dealer market
causes the ex isting dea lers to lo wer their ask prices and
rai se the ir bid pri ces to attrac t order fl ow.
In the competitive ma rke t, spreads dec lin ed to 79% in
a three-dea ler marke t with a decline o f onl y 56% of
average spreads in the two-deal e r marke t. G iven that
option s may be mu ltipl e listed o n up to six di ffe re nt
exchanges, the competiti ve effects of ad ding the fourt h,
fifth , and s ixth deal ers will o nly intensify the
compe titi ve effec t o f the third dea ler. Batta li o, Greene,
& Jennin g (1 997) used trading fl oo r data fro m a n
adju stme nt in stituted to attrac t order fl ow to regiona l
exc hanges by pe m1itting tTaders to beco me dealers o n
those exc han ges . S preads on the pri mary exchange
dec lin ed by 66% a nd those on the reg ional exc hanges
did not in crease a fter trading co mmenced o n the e
exchan ges as they co ntinu ed to direct o rder fl ow at the
na tional best bid a nd offer pri ces.
Multipl e listing was the o utcome of the Justice
Depa rtrnem s filin g s uit aga in st the exchanges for
noncompetiti ve action . A regul atory requ ire ment th us
forced competiti o n a mo ng exchanges that had long
co llud ed to keep most o ptions s in gl y listed. F rom the
literature o n the effect of regulatory refom1s on the stoc k
exchanges, Barclay ct al. ( 1999) assessed the impact of
intTodu cin g li mit orde rs subm itted by th e publi c in a
mu l tipl e -d c~!l e r marke t and ful l di sc losure to NAS DAQ
traders of s upe ri o r qu otes offered by NASDAQ dea lers
to eac h other in pri vate tradin g locatio ns. Both refonns
we re un de rtaken with a great deal of publicity and
exposure o f hi therto no ncompetitive pr:J c tices. Like \\ isc,
th e Ju sti ce Depa rt ment 's action was acco mpan ied by a
grea t dea l of negatin=-: pub licit y about co llus ive pri ce
all oca ti o n by the exc hanges .
T hat co mpetiti on \\'a s the main predi ctor of the
dec lin e in spre:Jd s is suppor
ted
by the 8Jrc lay et al.

21

2

Abraham
and HarTin gton
Abraham
and

JoumaIn
l ofA
BuMultiple
si ness and Leaders
hip : Research
, Practice, and Teaching
Harrington: Determinants of Option Spreads
Listing
Environment

( 1999) study with spreads in their post-reform NASDAQ
sa mple converging to the lower levels of the NYSE
(Barc lay et al. , 1999). Specifically, Barclay et al. ( 1999)
averaged effective spreads of$ 0.179 and $ .169 fo r two
separate NASDAQ sa mples while Huang and Stoll' s
( 1978) active ly !Taded NYSE stocks showed spreads of$
0. 158. We may also use the literature on the regulatory
effects of establi shing a Nati onal Market System
requiring the exc hange of real-time quote information
across stock exchanges (see Coughenour & Shastri,
1999, for a revi ew) . In a variety of environments,
spreads decreased with the introduction of shared q uotes
by more dea lers on the U.S. stock exchanges (Benston &
Hagerman , 1974; Stoll , 197 8), the London Stock
Exchange (Hansch, Na ik, & Vishwanathan , 1998) and
the interbank foreign exchange market (Huang &
Masulis, 1999).

•

METHODOLOGY

All stocks traded on the AMEX as of July 1, 2004,
were screened. The data range was the first five trading
days of J ul y 2004, or July 1-3, and 6-7, 2004. We first
exc luded all American Depos itory Receipts, and foreign
fi1ms. After exc lusion of foreign stocks, and those with
mi ssin g data , the fina l samp le of options on the
rema ining stocks consisted of 10,577 call options and
8,599 put options traded in July 2004. Only near-term (1
month maturi ties) , at-the- money options were used.
Additional quote data fi lters included (1) that ask
quotes be greater than bid quotes, (2) all bid quotes be
greater than zero . Trade data fi lters included (1)
identify ing exchanges and Iisting dates from Options
Industry Co un cil da ta onl y, (2) ensuring that trade price
and trade size we ..: greater than zero, and (3) restricting
trades to AM ~X- Ii sted stocks. Using separate data from
the AMEX, th e number of single and multiple li sted
opti ons was detem1in ed (tab le 1), with 1,736 single li sted
ca ll s and I ,3 20 sin gle Iis ted puts and 8,84 1 multiplelisted ca ll opti ons and 7,279 multipl e-li sted put options.

Given the above review, we ma y state the hypotheses as
follows:

•
•
•

H 4 : Bid-ask spreads of equity options vary inversely
with multipl e li stin g. Specifically, multiple listed
options will have sign ificantly lower bid-ask spreads
than sin gle li sted opti ons.

H 1, Bid-ask spreads of equi ty options vary directl y
wi th option pri ces.
H 2 : Bid-ask spreads of eq uity options vary directly
with option vo lat ili ty.
H 3 : Bid-ask spreads of eq uity option s vary inversely
with option vo lume.

Tabl e 1: Distribution of Options Among Exc han ges
Number o f Exchanges
One Exch:mge
Two Ex chan ges
Three Exc hanges
Four Exchanges
Five Exch anges
Six Ex changes

Call s

Pu ts

1736
1501
1791
1974
16883
1887

1320
1249
14 83
1645
141
1-189

Table 2: Relative Frequency Distribution of Quoted and
Effective Bid-As k Spreads of Equity Optio ns
Quoted
Bid-Ask Sprea d
<=. 10 -. 1
. 11 5
. 16·.25
20
.2 1>. 25

.85

Relat ive Fr<Oquency
Sin!gleiSt
ed Ca ll
OptiOn s(%)
6.3 1
6.54
.86
1-1
37. 18
35 11

Relati ve Freq uency
Multiple- Li sted
Ca ll Opuons (%)
41 .86
13.45
21.44
5 42
IH3
30.

Hfec ti ve
fl id-1\sk Spread

Relati ve Frequ ency
Sing l c- L~>tcd Ca ll
Opuons (%)

Relative frequency
Multipl e- Li sted
Ca ll Op tio ns(% )

<=.05
06- .30
10 13.
>. 30
. II - 20
.2
1-

10.88
11
21 .0 12
5.0.J
51 .00

38.59
27
11 48
5.62
3 1 00
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Relat ive Frequency
S111gle-Listed
Put Opntio
%) s(

15.90

5 67
6.95
16.55
40.67
16

Relative Frequency
S111Listed
glcons
Put Op ti ons(%)
7 .0-l
628
18 .3
7.34
60 79

22

Relative Frequen cy Multipl e- Li sted
Put Opti ons(%)
42 04
0
12 .58
22 .7
6 .78

Relauve JCrequency Multipl e-Listed
Put O
pri
(%)
71.5 1
5.79
5.52
3.20
139 1
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For both call and put options, the majori ty of the
options were li sted on four exchanges. T he mea n quoted
bid-ask spreads were significantl y hi gher for singlelisted over multipl e-listed opti ons fo r call s and puts for
both quoted spreads (t = 27.55 , p < .00 1, 5 1 = .29, 5 2 = .17
for calls and t = 3.45 , p <.05 , 5 1 = .28, 5 2 = .02 for puts)
and effective spreads (t = 7.39, p <. 001 , 5 1 = 1.35, 5 2 =
0.95 for calls and t = 3.4, p < .OOl, 5 1 = 1.43, 5 2 = 1.23 for
puts). Table 2 above provides a relati ve freq uency
distribution showing that quoted spreads c lu ster at lower
levels for mu ltiple-li sted options and at hi gher levels for
single-listed options [> .25 for quoted spreads of singlelisted call s and puts, <= .1 for multiple-li sted ca ll s and

puts; > .30 fo r effective spreads of sin gle listed ca ll s and
puts, and < .1 for multipl e- li sted ca ll s and puts].
Tabl e 3 be low shows the descripti ve stat isti cs of the
samp le. S in gle-li sted ca ll and put option s are offered by
finn s with considera bl y lower market ca pitalizations
averagi ng app roximately $ 1.3 milli on wh ile multipl eli sted options have about $ 13 mil li on. It fo ll ows th at
similar differences are observed in the volume of trades
(< 100 fo r single-listed options versus > 150 for
multipl e-listed opti ons) indicatin g not surpri sin gly, that
multipl e-li sted option s are more active ly traded .
However, vo latility measures are co mparabl e ra ngin g
fro m 0.3-0 .7 for each type of opti on.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Singl e and Multiple-Listed Optio ns
Single-Lis ted Ca llOption s
N ; I ,736 Va riab le
Market Cap
10"
Pri ce
Volume
Vo latili ty
Multi ple-Li sted Ca ll Options
N ; 8.841 Variable
Market Cap 10"
Pri ce
Volume
Volatili ty
Si ngle-Listed Put Opti ons
N ; I ,320 Vari able
Market Cap
Pri ce
Volum
e
Vo la tility
Multipl e-Li sted Put Opti ons
N ; 7,279 Variabl e
Market Cap
Pri ce
Volum
e
Vo la tility

Mean

Standard

Minimum

Maximum

34 ,946
0.025
I
0 .037
Minimum

19.83x
10"
14 .50
249
0 .763
Maximum

15.7 13
02
I
0 .0092
Min imum

952.70x 10 6
49 9
11 135
0 .86079
Maximum

34,946
0025
677
0 .1169
Minimum

19.83 X I 0"
12.65
I
0 .2677
Maxi mum

15,7 13
0.025
I
0 .0 1

1.-10 X 10"
66 .65
107.39
0 .778

Deviation
$ 1.37x
1.9972
21769
0 7026
Mean
13.40x
2.462 5
202 .6029
0 .640 1
Mea n
1.2 1 X 10°
1.91 39
93 5303
0 50 16
Mean
13.4 2x 10"
2 .4 734
154 .6 15
0 .5048

2.69x 10"
2.4848
33 .9793
06998
Sta ndard
Devia ti on
55.84 x I 0"
3.078 1
619.4039
0.5992
Standard
Deviati on
2.20x 10"
2. 1566
153.8 19 1
0.3 200
Standard
Devi ati on
72 .23 X I 0"
2.8777
549 96
0.385 1

fJ~ PR CF,

Where :

BAP, = Quoted spreads measured as (As k Pri ce - Bid
Pri ce) and Effecti ve spreads meas ured as [ABS(Trade
Pri ce - (Ask+Bid)/2].
PRC, = Option p1ice = [Bid + Ask]

2

VOL, = Dail y opti on vo lume

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss1/4

50%
Quartile
509 ,666
0.125
7.8
0 .3 5
50%
Quartil e
2.25x 106
I
33
0.4662
50%
Quartil e
509,666
1. 125
2-1 .5
0.-11 1
50°o
Quart il e
1.90 x 10 6
1.325
26
0 .-110

75%
Quartile
1.3 x I 0"
3.2
21
0 .78
75%
Quartile
8. 13 X 10"
-1.15
127
0.7 0735
75%
Qu artil e
1. 2 1 X 10"
2.85
91 75
0 58 2
75°·o
Quartil
7 58x 10 6
4.05
103
0 .585

VLTLY, = O ption volatility = T he impli ed standard
deviation from the Black-Scho les mode l
ML , = Mu ltipl e listing dummy; 0 = sin g le li sted option s
and I = multipl e-listed opti o ns
PRCF1 = Lo w pri ce correction factor (0 fo r pri ce > .5, l
for pri ce < .5)
VOLxML = T he mu lti pl e li stin g-vo lu me interaction
TME = Time to maturi ty
A ll mod e ls used quoted and effective pread s as the
criteri a. Th e use of both spreads is justifi ed in that they
prov ide a co mprehensive descri ptio n of spread s, ,,·it h
qu oted sprea ds show in g th e quoted bu y and se ll pri ces,
and effective sprea ds reflec tin g actual tran sac tion prices
whic h ma y be different from quoted pri ce s. T he Guj rati
and Mait a l correc ti on for l'irst-orde r au toc01Tebrion and
we ighted least squares co rrect ion fo r hcteroscedasti city

To test the hypotheses, the Nea l ( 1987) fo1111u lation
was used to create four mode ls of bid-ask spreads.
Linear, logarithmic, squared logarithmi c, and quare root
functional form s were tested for the fo ll owi ng mode l:

BAP, = o. 1 + f3 1PRC1 + f3 2 VOL 1 + f3 3 VLTLY1 +
+ f3 5ML, + f3 6 VOLYML + f3 7 TME, ( l )

25%
Q uartil e
22 5,892
0 .125
5
0 .32
25%
Quartile
557 .875
0.1
10
0 .3 158
25%
Quart ile
241 ,926
0 .225
5 .25
0 .302
25%
Q uarti le
532,436
0 . 102
10
0 .299
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wa ap pli ed to fu nctiona l form s tested inc luding the
linear, loga1ithmic , sq uared logari thm a nd square root
fom1 s of vo lu me.

in th is ca se its effect o n spreads was predo minantly
positi ve in 14 of 16 mode ls, possibl y indicating the
presence of a ri sk prem ium dema nded by market makers
for moving off the effic ient fTo nti er. Volume and
multipl e li sting were inve rsely related to spreads. The
in teraction between volume and multiple li sting was
ignifi cantl y negative (p< .Ol ) indicating that multiple
li sting acted in conj unctio n with vo lume to signifi cantly
red uce spreads in a ll models or the variance due to
co mpetitio n and that d ue to inc reased volume jointly
expl ai ned an average of 4% of the variance in call
option s a nd 3% of the vari ance in spreads for put options
respecti ve ly.

Resu lts
Hypo these 1-4 were s uppo rted w ith pri ce , vo lume ,
vo la tility and mu ltiple li stin g bein g hi ghl y s ignifi cant in
expl a inin g preads. Pri ce pos itive ly intlue nced spreads
be in g the sin g le most powerfu l predictor in 14 of 16
mode l for bo th quoted and effect ive spread fo r put a nd
ca ll optio ns (t va lues ran ged from 3. 57- 15.96).
A lth o ug h vo la tili ty ha s s hown in con s istent s ign in
previous studi es (see Kho ury e t a !. , 2002 for a review) ,

Tab le 4: Reg ression s of Bid-Ask Sprea ds on Call and Put Options
Quo ted S preads
Price
Volume

Mod e l I s)
(Call
.02 -1***
( 15.96)
.J. .J X \0' '
(-J .OO)

Model 2
(Cal b )
.025 ***
(8.88)
-\. 08 X \ 0
(--1 52)

Vol u
me
M ulti ple Ltsll ng
Vo lume x
Mu lilpl c L1st tng

Vo la lll tty

-. 11 ***
(-7. 83)
-4 X
10 5" '

-.09 ***
(-9.5J)

(-J.60)

(-2 .0 1)

.009***
(3 .J I l

009**'
(3 3 I )

-.002
(-1.6(1)
.0 17**
(3 01)
13

.0 12" ..
(2 -16)
0 17*
'
(2 .59)
14

.069***
(.J 62)
-1.6 X I 0 °***
(-4.27)

.0(>9*'*
(4 .5J)
-8.4 X
I 0 ' ***
(- 1. 87 )

-\ X

10 ,.

Lo" Pncc Fac tor

TlmC

R
Hkcll\C Spreads
Pnce
Vo lume

Volume·
1\lult•plc I J>t1ng
Volume'
1\lulurlc l1st•ng
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Multiple li sting emerged as the more powerful
predictor in relation to volume w ith full y 3 .8-5.2 % of the
variance in spreads being explained by multipl e li sting
as opposed to only .8-3 .4% by vo lume for quoted
spreads of call options. For quoted spreads of puts, 1.5 %
of the variance in spreads was exp lained by multipl e
listing versus .04-.05% for volume. Multipl e li stin g
showed higher significance in 6 of 8 models for quoted
spreads and 5 of 8 models for effecti ve sprea ds.

transaction s costs and li quidity traders who w ish to ad d
options to their portfo li os. We may expect that in a
multipl e-listed environmen t, both numbers of both types
of traders wi ll in crease, i.e. the liquid ity traders who
wish to add options whi ch are more readi ly available
with larger vo lumes, and informed traders who w ish to
find opti ons with greater profit potenti al. Admati and
Pfleiderer ( 1988) model the effects of informed trad ers
h·ading on the same pri vate in formation (pres umably
in fo rmation about an upco ming multipl e li stin g
ann ouncement) . Such h·aders wi ll compete with each
other limi ting their ga in s or reduc ing their losses to the
market maker who wi ll set lower spreads. Empirica l
tests of thi s theory may be undertaken us ing pre- and
post mu lti pl e li stin g options data.
The equity option s market may be on the c usp of a
tra nsiti on in market sh·ucture. Options h·ading on a
single exchange represented a monopol y with the
exchanges reaping monopoly profits due to their
ex istence as a s in g le source fo r a partic ul ar opti on. When
the Securiti es and Exchange Co mmi ss ion imposed a
morat01ium on new li stin gs fro m 1985-19 89, the market
became contestable (Nea l, 1987) . In a contestabl e
market, competitors await the opportunity fo r market
entry given the ex istence of signifi cant entry ban·iers .
T he cunent climate of success ive waves of multipl e
li stin g may have rend ered a structure of perfect
competition in which there is free entry and exist, entry
barri ers are few, and the product is sta ndardi zed (for
exa mp le, the same option on Coca Co la stock listed on 2
exchanges is in di stin guishab le). F uture resea rch mu st
conduct tests of the options market as a contestabl e
market in the mid-1 980 ' s fo llowed by tests for
co mpetitive markets fo r data from 2000-present. If the
market is ivund to be competiti ve , the next research
question to be addressed is if co mpetiti ve shoJi-run
equilibrium has been reached.

CONCLUSION

In the first empiri ca l examin ation of cunent options
markets using all options traded on a maj or exchange
(the American Stock Exchange) , thi s study has observed
that bid-ask spreads in a predomi nantl y multipl e li sted
environment are determined by traditional B lackScholes options characteri stics includin g pri ce, vo lume,
and volatility along w ith multipl e li stin g as a measure of
competition among exc hanges for order tlow .
Higher priced options command a premium and are
therefore linked with 1i sing spread s. Vo latili ty effects
support Stoll 's ( 1978) contention that the ass umpti on of
greater risk lead s market makers to demand hi gher
spreads. Volume effects are more compl ex in nature . By
definition , economi es of scale in option s markets ass ume
the existence of ri sing vo lumes of options fo r sale on the
exchanges which , as vo lume is in verse ly related to
spreads, dri ves down spread s. Multipl e li stin g leads to
ri sing volumes w ith large volumes being assoc iated w ith
multipl e li stin g (mean volumes fo r multipl e-li sted
options = 159-202 as opposed to 2 1-93 for s ingle-] is ted
options) as more options on the sa me stock are avai lable
for sale on multipl e exchanges. Both vo lu me (economi es
of scale) and multipl e li stin g reduce spreads. Yet, our
comparative analys is of mul tiple li stin g and vo lume
indicates that multipl e li stin g effects dominate volume
effects.
In other words, the reduct ion of sprea ds du e to
competition fro m other exchan ges is more powerfu l that
similar reductions due to the mere in crease in opti ons
available for sa le up to 4 yea rs after most of the opti ons
on the AMEX were initi all y multipl e listed. Thi s result
indi cates the robu stness of co mpetiti ve effec ts on
spreads over time and sho uld fom1 the bas is for future
longitudinal examination s of spreads in th e 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5, year peri od after initi al multipl e li stin g.
Future resea rch should address the und erlyin g ca uses
of the importa nce of mul tipl e li stin g in ex pla inin g
spreads. There are tvvo ty pes o f trad ers, in fo rmed traders
who seek profit-makin g oppo rtuniti es at lower

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss1/4

Implication s
Spreads ha ve dec lin ed sin ce Augu st 1999, when
options first became mul tip le listed to a large extent.
T herefore, it is less ex pensive for h·ad ers to purchase
option s possi bl y stimul ating an increase in options
tradin g. Sma ll er h·aders who were not able to trade in
equi ty opti ons are in a positi on to enter the options
market. As th e opti ons market offe rs the benefit of
un limited upside potential (a lbeit with downside ri sk) ,
such small traders and investors have an expanded arra y
o f in vestment opportuni ties. Fo r options traded on s ix
exc hanges , i.e the largest fim1 s and those tha t became
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Journal of Finance, 54: 1-34.

multipl e li sted a t the very beg inning of th e opti on s
campa ign, s uc h as LBM, Mo toro la, Wa iMart , and
J ohn so n & J o hnso n, the sprea d dec lin es a re substantial.
ln the wake of the uncerta inty in th e finan c ial marke ts
fol lowin g the e vents of Septe mber 1 I , 200 I , new li stings
have been predominantly in thi category. Further
reduction s in spreads be nefi t traders w ho c hoose to trade
in these options.
Electron ic lTadi ng commenced in 1999 w ith the
OJ ening of the In te rn ational Securiti es Exc ha nge, the
first ful ly e lectroni ca ll y traded exchange . Th is wa s
fo ll owed two years later with the opening of the Boston
Exchan ge. T he In te rn ati ona l Sec uriti es Excha nge , in
particular, ha s diverted order flo w fro m the fl oor-ba sed
exchanges. For ex ampl e, illM 's primary exc hange (the
excha nge on which the bul k of its opt io ns were traded)
was the C hicago Board Option s Exc ha nge for seve ra l
yea rs. Today, illM 's pnmary excha nge IS th e
Intemational Sec uritie s Exchange. S uch di vers ion has
occu rred to the ex te nt that the fl oor-ba sed exc hanges
have started thei r own e lectroni c tradin g d ivision s.
Traders sho uld benefit as spreads continue to decline
with e lectronic trading.
Exchanges have attempted to protect thei r profit
margins by engagi ng in pa yment for orde r fl ow,
whereby th ey pay custom ers for the di, ersion of order
flow to themse lve . Such practices arc being cu11ai le d by
the Secu rit1 es a nd Exc han ge Co mmi ss ion as ind icated by
a recent rejection of a request by the Pa c ifi c Stock
I: xc hange to expand payment for o rder flow . T he
regulatory environment appears to favo r a free fa ll in
spread s to the advan ta ge of traders.
Market makers may be ab le to pro li t from dec linin g
spreads as part of a hedging strategy. If s toc k pri ces
declme, they may short sel l ca lls w hereby they borrow
ca ll opt ions. sell them , at h igher sprea ds, and repay ca ll
O\\ ners '' 1th calls at reduced spread s. J f stock pri ces ri se,
they may s hort se ll puts whe re a s imil ar seque nce or
e\ent will occur ''ith puts in stead of ca ll s. Empirically,
such act l\lty be
mJy
tested by exam inin g dai ly short
sak:. va lu es and the cha nge 111 daily put ca ll ra ti os.
C11 \ en that market makers are attempting to e rect ba rr iers
to entry through payment for o rder fl ow, it is poss ible
th:ll they hJ\'e not embarke d on suc h a hedg in g stra tegy
at th1~ t1me.

Battalio, R., G reene, J. , & Je nnings, R 1997. Do
co mpetin g spec ia li sts and preferencing dealers affect
marke t quality? Review of Financial Studies, 10:
969-993 .
Benston , G. , & Hagem1an, R. 1974. Determinants of
bid-asked spreads in the over-the-counter market.
Journal of Financial Eco nomics , I: 353-364.
B loomfie ld, R., & O ' H ara , M . 1998. Does order
pre fere nc ing matte r? Journal of Financial Economics,
50: 3-37.
Cougheno ur, J., & ShastTi, K . 1999. Sympos ium on
ma rke t mi crostn.1cture: A rev1ew of empirical
resea rc h. Finan cia l R eview, 34 : 1-28.
D a ni s, M. 2003 . Compe titi on in equity option markets.
Unpubli shed docto ra l di sse11ati o n, Uni versity of North
Ca ro lina-C hape l Hill ,
R a leig h, North Carolina. D e
Fontn o uve ll e, P ., F ishe, R. , & J. Ham s. 2003. The
be havio r of bid -ask spreads a nd vo lume in options
markets during the com petiti o n fo r li stings in 1999.
Journal of Finance, 58: 2437-2 463.
De mse tz, H . 1968. The cos t of tra nsacting. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 68: 33-53.
George, T., Kaul , G., &
ima lendran, M. 1991.
Estimati o n of th e bid-ask spread and its co mponents:
A new a pproac h. R ev iew of Financial Studies, 4:
623-656.
H an sc h, 0 ., N aik, N. , & Vi shwanathan , S. 199 8.
Pre feren c ing , internali zation, best exec uti on, and
dea ler profits. Working Paper, Pennsylvania State
Un ivers ity.
Hu a ng, R ., & M asuli s, R. 1999. PX spreads a nd dealer
co mpe titi on across the 24-ho ur trading da y . Review
of Financial Studies, 12: 6 1-94.
Huang, R., & S to ll , H . 1997. T he co mpo ne nts ofthe bidas k sprea d : A gene ra l a pproac h. Review of Financial
S tudies, I 0: 995- 1034.

REFE RE:\'CE S

Kh o ury, N , & Fisc he r, K . 2002. T he effect of multipl e
listin gs o n the bid-a sk spread in opti o n markets: The
c3se of Montrea l Excha nge. Journal of Futures

1\dmat
& Plleidcrcr, P. 1992. A theory of intrada y
p;Jtlern s: Vo lu me ami pnce \'a riab ili ty, Revi ew of
Fi nan cia l S tudies , I : 3--l O.

Published by FHSU Scholars Repository, 2006

26

7

Jou rnal of Business
and Leadership
: Research,
Pracucc,
and 1,
Teach1ng
Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching
(2005-2012),
Vol.
2 [2006],
No.
Art. 4

Abraham and Harrington

Markets, 22: 939-957.

Finance, 57: 93 1-958.

Mayhew, S. 2002 . Competition, market structure, and
bid-ask spreads in stock option markets . Journal of

Sto ll , H. 1978. T he suppl y of dea ler services in securitie
marke ts . Journal of Finance, 33: 11 33 -11 5 1.

Rebecca Abraham is a professor of finance at No va Southeastern Uni ve rsity . She rece ived her DBA in fina nce from
United States International U niversity. Her current resea rch int erests include op ti on pricin g theory and asset
mispricing. She has publi shed in Journa l of Economi c Studies, Review of Accou nting and Fina nce, Internation a l
Journal of Finance, and Busin ess Review . Her books are Sources: Notab le Selecti ons in Econo mi cs pub! ished by
McGraw Hill , and Organiza ti onal C ynici sm: De finiti on, Bases, and Consequences publi shed by Mel len Press .
Charles Harrington is a lecturer in economi cs at Nova So utheastern U ni versity, He received hi s MA in economi cs
from Northeastern University. Hi s current resea rch interests include option pri cing theory and asset mi spri cing. He has
published in the Review of Accounting and F inance.

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss1/4

27

8

